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469 
BAREFOOT IN QUICKSAND: THE FUTURE OF “FUTURE 
DANGEROUSNESS” PREDICTIONS IN DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING IN THE WORLD OF DAUBERT AND KUMHO 
Thomas Regnier* 
It is my opinion that such future-telling is admissible under no theory 
of law and prejudicial beyond belief . . . .† 
—Judge Wendell A. Odom 
[P]sychiatric predictions based on hypothetical situations sometimes 
bear more resemblance to medieval fortune-telling than to modern 
scientific techniques.‡ 
—Texas Defender Service 
Shortly after midnight on October 24, 1984, Thomas Barefoot was 
executed by lethal injection in Huntsville, Texas,1 for the murder of a 
policeman.2 While it may not be surprising that Barefoot would be put to 
death for this crime, what is disturbing is the way the state of Texas 
arrived at the decision to execute Barefoot rather than sentence him to 
life in prison. Under Texas sentencing procedures, a convicted murderer 
could be put to death only if a jury found that he was likely to be 
 
 *  Thomas Regnier (J.D., University of Miami, summa cum laude; B.A., Trinity College, Phi 
Beta Kappa) is a Judicial Law Clerk to the Hon. Melvia B. Green, Florida Third District Court of 
Appeal, and a Lecturer at University of Miami School of Law.  The author thanks Professor Susan 
Haack for her comments and guidance. 
 †  State v. Smith, 534 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Odom, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 ‡  TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 45 (as modified May 22, 2003), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20of% 
20denial/Chap3.pdf. 
 1. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 220 (1991). 
 2. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 883 (1983) (holding psychiatric predictions of future 
dangerousness admissible in death penalty sentencing), superseded on other grounds by statute, as 
stated in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 480-81 (2000). 
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dangerous in the future.3 In other words, Barefoot’s death sentence was 
based, not only on an act he had done in the past, but on acts that the 
jury anticipated he might do in the future. In addition, the jury’s decision 
was partially based on predictions, made by two psychiatrists, that 
Barefoot would be dangerous in the future, in spite of the fact that the 
American Psychiatric Association disclaims such predictions, admitting 
that they are wrong twice as often as they are right.4 Finally, and this 
fact is perhaps most disturbing of all, the entire process received the seal 
of approval of the U.S. Supreme Court.5 
To understand the Barefoot decision, it is necessary to examine 
Jurek v. Texas,6 an earlier case in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of using predictions of future dangerousness as an 
element in capital sentencing.7 I will begin by analyzing the background 
to Barefoot, and then the Barefoot case itself. I will consider how 
admissibility of future dangerousness testimony in capital cases may or 
may not have changed after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals8 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.9 I 
will argue that future dangerousness predictions in capital cases are an 
unconstitutional due process violation, and that they violate evidentiary 
principles requiring reliability and excluding evidence that is 
substantially misleading or prejudicial. Finally, I will argue that we must 
re-think the Daubert/Kumho test for admissibility of expert testimony so 
as to preserve the insights of the Frye v. United States10 test and ensure 
that reliability becomes the keynote in both scientific and technical 
testimony. 
I.  BEFORE BAREFOOT: JUREK PARK 
The law regarding the death penalty in the United States changed 
dramatically in 1972 with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Furman v. Georgia.11 In a five-to-four decision, the Court effectively 
struck down the death penalty procedures then in existence in the United 
 
 3. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981). 
 4. Brief for American Psychiatric Association, as Amicus Curiae, at 9, Barefoot v. Estelle, 
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) [hereinafter APA Brief]. 
 5. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 905. 
 6. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 7. Id. at 276. 
 8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 9. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 10. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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States.12 The Court’s rationale was difficult to discern, however, as each 
of the five justices in the majority wrote his own opinion.13 Justices 
Brennan14 and Marshall15 argued that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional in all circumstances, as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”16 They 
interpreted “cruel and unusual” through the lens of “evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”17 and found 
that the death penalty served no legitimate retributive or deterrent 
function.18 
Justices Douglas,19 Stewart,20 and White21 found that the death 
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment because it was administered 
with such a wide range of discretion that the results were arbitrary and 
unpredictable.22 They were disturbed by the disproportionate application 
of the death penalty based on racial factors.23 
The upshot was that the states could administer the death penalty 
only if they were able to devise new death penalty schemes that guided a 
jury’s discretion in such a way as to remove the arbitrary and 
discriminatory effects that the Court had disapproved.24 
After Furman, about three-fourths of the states enacted new death 
penalty laws.25 Some states solved the problem of rampant jury 
discretion by simply requiring mandatory death sentences for particular 
types of crimes.26 Most states, however, adopted “guided discretion” 
statutes.27 In these schemes, a separate sentencing hearing, or “penalty 
phase,” takes place after the defendant is found guilty of first degree 
murder.28 The sentencer (usually the jury) chooses either the death 
penalty or life in prison (with or without the possibility of parole) based 
 
 12. JOHN KAPLAN, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 512-13 (4th ed. 2000). 
 13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. 
 14. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 15. Id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 16. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 17. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C. J.). 
 18. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 301-05 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 19. Id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 20. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 23. See id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 24. KAPLAN, supra note 12, at 513. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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on a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.29 This model has 
become the norm for death penalty procedures in the United States.30 
On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court decided a set of five 
companion cases considering the constitutionality of newly enacted 
death penalty procedures in five states: Georgia, Florida, Texas, North 
Carolina, and Louisiana. The North Carolina31 and Louisiana32 statutes, 
which had revived the automatic death penalty for certain crimes, were 
struck down. The Georgia,33 Texas,34 and Florida35 statutes, all of which 
provided for guided discretion, were upheld. Although the Georgia 
statute in Gregg received the most attention at the time, it is only the 
Texas statute, upheld in Jurek, which is relevant to the issue of future 
dangerousness. Texas is the only state that requires prediction of future 
dangerousness to be considered in imposing the death penalty,36 
although a few other states allow it to be considered as an aggravating 
factor.37 
Jerry Lane Jurek was convicted in Texas for the August 16, 1973,38 
murder of a ten-year-old girl.39 The murder took place as part of the 
kidnapping and attempted rape of the child.40 He was found guilty of 
first degree murder and sentenced to death under two Texas statutes that 
had been passed in response to Furman.41 Article 1257, Texas Penal 
Code,42 defined the offense, and article 37.071, Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure,43 prescribed the punishment. Article 1257(b)(2) provided, in 
part: 
(b) The punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death 
or imprisonment for life if: . . . 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 32. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 33. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 34. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 35. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 36. Jurek v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Odom, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); see also Guy Goldberg & Gena Blum, Balancing Fairness and Finality: 
A Comprehensive Review of the Texas Death Penalty, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 128 (2000). 
 37. See Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors 
in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE 81, 105 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999). 
 38. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 937 n.1. 
 39. Id. at 936-37. 
 40. Id. at 937. 
 41. Id. at 938. 
 42. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257 (Vernon 1973) (effective June 14, 1973). 
 43. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1973) (effective June 14, 1973). 
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(2) the person intentionally committed the murder in the course of 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, 
robbery, forcible rape, or arson . . . .44 
Article 37.071, delineating the sentencing phase of the proceedings, 
provided: 
(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the 
court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine 
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 
The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial 
jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be 
presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence. 
This subsection may not be construed to authorize the introduction of 
any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States or of the State of Texas. The state and the defendant or his 
counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against the 
sentence of death. 
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall 
submit the following issues to the jury: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of 
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat 
to society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant 
in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the 
provocation, if any, by the deceased. 
(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of “yes” or “no” on 
 
 44. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257 (Vernon 1973). The statute defines four other categories 
under which a person may be guilty of first degree murder: 
(1) the person murdered a peace officer or fireman who was acting in the lawful 
discharge of an official duty and who the defendant knew was a peace officer or fireman; 
 . . . 
(3) the person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or 
employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration; 
(4) the person committed the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a 
penal institution; 
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murdered another who was 
employed in the operation of the penal institution. 
5
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each issue submitted. 
(d) The court shall charge the jury that: 
(1) it may not answer any issue “yes” unless it agrees 
unanimously; and 
(2) it may not answer any issue “no” unless 10 or more jurors 
agree. 
(e) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted 
under this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the 
jury returns a negative finding on any issue submitted under this 
article, the court shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the 
Texas Department of Corrections for life. 
(f) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject 
to automatic review by the Court of Criminal Appeals within 60 days 
after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless 
time is extended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the 
Court of Criminal Appeals for good cause shown. Such review by the 
Court of Criminal Appeals shall have priority over all other cases, and 
shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Court of 
Criminal Appeals.45 
When Jurek’s case reached the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,46 
the court upheld the statutory scheme as constitutional.47 The court 
approved Article 1257 on the basis that it limited the circumstances 
under which the state could seek the death penalty to a small group of 
narrowly defined and especially brutal offenses.48 The court found 
article 37.071 acceptable because, in response to Furman, it provided a 
separate sentencing procedure and limited jury discretion.49 The court 
found that the questions asked of the jury “channel the jury’s 
consideration on punishment and effectively insure against the arbitrary 
and wanton imposition of the death penalty.”50 
The court next addressed Jurek’s argument that subsection (b)(2) of 
article 37.071, the future dangerousness element, was too vague to 
provide adequate guidance to the jury:51 
[T]here are some factors which are readily apparent and are viable 
 
 45. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1973) (emphasis added). 
 46. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 934. 
 47. Id. at 940. 
 48. Id. at 939. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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factors for the jury’s consideration. In determining the likelihood that 
the defendant would be a continuing threat to society, the jury could 
consider whether the defendant had a significant criminal record. It 
could consider the range and severity of his prior criminal conduct. It 
could further look to the age of the defendant and whether or not at the 
time of the commission of the offense he was acting under duress or 
under the domination of another. It could also consider whether the 
defendant was under an extreme form of mental or emotional pressure, 
something less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the emotions of 
the average man, however inflamed, could withstand.52 
Note that the court does not suggest, nor does it reject, enlisting 
expert witnesses to help the jury determine a defendant’s future 
dangerousness. 
Judges Odom and Roberts, both dissenting at least in part, found 
subsection (b)(2) problematically vague.53 The subsection says that the 
jury must find whether there is a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence.54 Subsection (c) requires, before 
imposition of the death penalty, that the jury find this probability, as well 
as the elements of subsections (b)(1) and (3) to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt.55 But what does this mean, to find that there is 
“probability” that a person will commit acts of violence “beyond a 
reasonable doubt?” What is meant by a probability beyond a reasonable 
doubt? Does it mean that, beyond a reasonable doubt, there is some 
probability? How much probability? Any probability?56 Judge Roberts 
noted that this formula would have to be answered in the affirmative for 
every individual because it is beyond a reasonable doubt that every 
person has some probability (though admittedly it may be very small for 
many of those people) that he or she will commit criminal acts of 
violence at some time in the future.57 Presumably only the dead are 
absolutely incapable of committing future acts of violence. 
Judge Roberts considered the future dangerousness issue even more 
deeply and stated: 
I have other, graver reservations about subsection (b)(2). Under this 
subsection we go beyond our traditional understanding of reasonable 
doubt, which is based on the defensible premise that where acts have 
 
 52. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 939-40. 
 53. Id. at 943-50 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 54. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1973). 
 55. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(c) (Vernon 1973). 
 56. See Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 945 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57. Id. at 948 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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been performed, they can be proven to have produced an incident 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This concept has been tried, tested, and 
proven valid. 
   But under subsection (b)(2) the jury is required to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an individual, the defendant, will in the future 
perform certain acts. This adopts the principle of predestination: That 
man is destined to do certain things and hence has no control over his 
actions. If this be true, we should not punish or attempt to rehabilitate, 
since the defendant is no more responsible for his acts than an 
individual who is insane at the time he commits an offense. 
   However, if individuals are responsible for their acts—as I 
believe—this cannot be true; yet if individuals are so responsible, 
(b)(2) is unconstitutional, since it is impossible to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty that a person will act in a 
certain manner in the future.58 
Judge Roberts perhaps overstates the case when he speaks of 
predestination: it is quite possible to find that certain events are highly 
likely without finding that they are inevitable or predetermined.59 
Nevertheless, Judge Roberts has here hit upon the mind-boggling flaw 
that the majority overlooked: how can a legal system that prides itself on 
due process make imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to life in 
prison, turn on someone’s—anyone’s—speculation about what that 
person will do in the future? Can we justifiably put someone to death for 
a crime he has not yet committed? The Texas penalty procedure for 
capital murder in effect says to the defendant: “Your past crimes have 
earned you at least life in prison. We will now determine whether to put 
you to death based on our predictions of your as-yet-uncommitted 
crimes.” 
This dilemma puts us at the crossroads of science and law. Faigman 
notes that while law operates on the premise that people are responsible 
for their actions, science assumes that people are affected by some 
combination of their biology and their experiences.60 If we take the 
 
 58. Id. at 948 n.6 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 59. Perhaps Judge Roberts was doing what philosopher Daniel Dennett describes as confusing 
determinism with fatalism. See Ronald Bailey, Pulling Our Own Strings, REASON 25, 27 (May 
2003) (quoting Dennett as saying, “Fatalism is the idea that something’s going to happen no matter 
what you do. Determinism is the idea that what you do depends. .  .  . still, what you do matters. . . .  
Fatalism is determinism with you left out.”). 
 60. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 27 
(1999). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/2
REGNIER1.DOC 4/26/2004  11:04 AM 
2004] BAREFOOT IN QUICKSAND 477 
purely legal viewpoint and assume free will, we will consider Jurek to be 
an autonomous individual who may choose to be violent or not. Since it 
is entirely possible that he will choose not to be violent, it would be 
unjust to execute him. Besides, as Judge Roberts points out, there is the 
empirical difficulty that we cannot see into the future in order to know 
“beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty”61 what will happen. 
Even if we take the purely “scientific” viewpoint, in Faigman’s terms, 
and assume that Jurek’s future violence is predetermined based on his 
nature and his nurture, it is still a policy decision whether we choose to 
execute him based on our conclusions about his future behavior. It 
would seem that we have a well-established, though flexibly defined, 
policy known as “due process,” which, it could be argued, would 
militate against using speculation about future behavior as justification 
for an execution. 
There is an additional problem with the Texas statute, which went 
unaddressed by any of the Texas courts and even by the U.S. Supreme 
Court when it eventually reviewed the case. The problem was perhaps 
first pointed out by Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.62 Take another look at 
article 37.071(b): 
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall 
submit the following issues to the jury: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of 
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat 
to society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant 
in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the 
provocation, if any, by the deceased.63 
The jury has to answer “yes” to all three of the questions before a 
defendant may receive the death penalty. The defendant may thus escape 
execution by winning on any one of the three points. But this is less 
consolation than one might think if one looks closely at the three 
questions. Point (1) amounts to the question of whether the defendant 
 
 61. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 948 n.6 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 62. Charles L. Black, Jr., Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 
CATH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1976). 
 63. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1973). 
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killed deliberately. Remember that this is being asked as part of the 
sentencing phase for first degree murder, where guilt has already been 
determined. As noted earlier, Article 1257(b)(2), under which Jurek was 
found guilty, provides: 
(b) The punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death 
or imprisonment for life if: . . . 
(2) the person intentionally committed the murder in the course of 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, 
robbery, forcible rape, or arson . . . . 64 
The phrases “malice aforethought” and “intentionally” already appear in 
the definition of the crime.65 Since the jury will already have agreed that 
these elements exist in finding the defendant guilty, it would be utterly 
illogical for it now to find that the defendant didn’t do it “deliberately.”66 
Likewise, point (3) raises the issue of whether the victim may have 
provoked the murderer in some way. Surely, this issue would already 
have been considered in the guilt phase, and if sufficient provocation had 
been found the defendant would have been convicted of some lesser 
charge, such as murder without malice or manslaughter.67 In short, 
questions (1) and (3) involve issues that in most cases would have 
already been answered affirmatively; the death sentence, then, would 
depend entirely on the assessment of future dangerousness. But how can 
there be “due process” when the outcome depends strictly on someone’s 
surmises about the future, not on provable incidents from the past? 
When Jurek’s case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice 
Stevens, writing for a plurality, grappled with Jurek’s contention that it 
was impossible to predict future behavior and that the question posed by 
article 37.071(b)(2) was so vague as to be meaningless.68 Perhaps 
“grappled” is the wrong word, considering what Justice Stevens and his 
colleagues did with the question. Stevens wrote: 
The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean 
that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is 
 
 64. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257(b)(2) (Vernon 1973) (emphasis added). 
 65. Note that the word “intentionally” does not appear in any of the other four categories of 
first degree murder, though “malice aforethought” still applies to all of them. See TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 1257 (Vernon 1973). While § 1257 was the operating law at the time of Jurek’s crime, it had 
already been superseded by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03. (Vernon 1974) (effective January 1, 
1974), which was substantially similar, by the time of the U.S. Supreme Court decision. See Jurek, 
428 U.S. at 265 n.1. 
 66. Black, supra note 62, at 3-4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/2
REGNIER1.DOC 4/26/2004  11:04 AM 
2004] BAREFOOT IN QUICKSAND 479 
an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our 
criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to 
bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction of the 
defendant’s future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict 
a convicted person’s probable future conduct when it engages in the 
process of determining what punishment to impose. For those 
sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole 
authorities. The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the 
statutory question in issue is thus basically no different from the task 
performed countless times each day throughout the American system 
of criminal justice. What is essential is that the jury have before it all 
possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose 
fate it must determine.69 
What the Court did here was not to grapple with, but to dodge the 
issue. Yes, it is difficult to make predictions about the future, the Court 
concedes; but we’ve been making predictions about the future for a long 
time about many things, so why stop here? In other words, because the 
criminal justice system makes predictions about the future in the 
contexts of (a) setting bail, (b) sentencing in general, and (c) parole 
decisions, why shouldn’t it make future predictions when it decides 
whether or not to impose the death penalty? The Court could have 
answered its own question with a phrase it coined in one of the 
companion cases to Jurek, decided on the same day: “death is 
different.”70 As the Court said in Gregg: 
While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per 
se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, it 
did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any 
other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. 
Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it 
could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a 
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.71 
But what could be more arbitrary and capricious than inflicting this 
unique punishment based on someone’s guess about the future? 
In fact, distinguishing common future dangerousness predictions (in 
the settings of bail, general sentencing and parole) from future 
dangerousness predictions in capital cases should have been child’s play 
to jurists of Supreme Court caliber. As to bail, an overly cautious 
 
 69. Id. at 274-76 (citations omitted). 
 70. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. 
 71. Id. 
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prediction error in admitting a defendant to bail may involve a 
temporary loss of the defendant’s liberty. And while questions of 
punishment in noncapital cases may involve a consideration of future 
dangerousness, they usually concentrate on the seriousness of the crime 
or crimes the person has committed in the past. Finally, parole decisions 
are actually decisions about whether to lessen a prisoner’s sentence, not 
increase it. While there are potential hazards in all three situations, they 
do not entail the irreversible extinguishing of the defendant’s life. In 
addition, the Court entirely overlooked the fact that on that same day, it 
had approved two death penalty schemes (Florida’s72 and Georgia’s73) 
that did not use future dangerousness predictions. 
But the Court, for whatever reason, chose to breeze over the fact, 
and the accompanying legal principle, that death is different to uphold, 
in theory, the use of future dangerousness predictions for determining 
the death penalty. Other than the Court’s statement, “[w]hat is essential 
is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the 
individual defendant,”74 the Court’s opinion didn’t delve into the issue of 
what kinds of information might be relevant in predicting future 
dangerousness, and it didn’t touch the issue of how, or whether, expert 
testimony might play a part in those predictions. Later, when Barefoot 
came along, the Court was stuck by stare decisis, or at least it acted as if 
it were. The Court’s decision in Barefoot was inevitable unless it forsook 
the two points made in Jurek: (1) that the death penalty could turn on 
future dangerousness predictions and (2) that the jury needed to have all 
the relevant information about the defendant. 
II.  BAREFOOT BOY MEETS “DOCTOR DEATH” (BUT ONLY IN COURT) 
While psychiatric testimony was not presented in Jurek,75 it 
occupied center stage in the Barefoot case. On August 7, 1978, Thomas 
Barefoot fatally shot a police officer in the head at point-blank range 
after the officer had stopped him for questioning in an arson 
investigation.76 A jury found him guilty of capital murder.77 At the 
penalty phase of the trial, two psychiatrists, Drs. John Holbrook and 
James Grigson, testified that Barefoot would probably commit future 
 
 72. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242. 
 73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at  153. 
 74. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276. 
 75. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897 (“[T]here was only lay testimony with respect to dangerousness 
in Jurek.”). 
 76. Barefoot v. Texas, 596 S.W.2d 875, 878-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). 
 77. Id. at 878. 
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acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.78 
Neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot; both based their 
predictions on a set of hypothetical questions put to them by the 
prosecution.79 
Dr. Grigson, a Dallas forensic psychiatrist, nicknamed “Dr. Death” 
for his testimony in death penalty cases, eventually testified for the state 
of Texas in over 140 capital trials.80 Dr. Grigson’s testimony almost 
never changed from case to case.81 He would testify “as a matter of 
medical certainty” that the defendant was the most severe type of 
“sociopath,” that is, a person who is not mentally ill, but is beyond the 
range of psychiatric treatment.82 Dr. Grigson invariably stated that he 
was 100% certain of his conclusions, that the defendant would only get 
worse and would most certainly kill again if not executed.83 Over two 
decades, Grigson testified in one-third of all Texas capital cases that 
ended in the death penalty; in over 90% of the cases in which he 
testified, the jury sentenced the defendant to death.84 
A 1989 study of the post-commutation behavior of ninety-two 
former Texas death row inmates whose death sentences were reversed 
and commuted in the early 1980’s indicated that Dr. Grigson’s 
predictions were extremely unreliable.85 In one case, Grigson continued 
to maintain that his prediction at the trial—that the defendant was on the 
“severe end of the scale” of sociopathy and would continue to be a threat 
to society—had been correct, even after the prisoner was released from 
death row because he was found to be innocent.86 In 1995, after repeated 
reprimands, Grigson was expelled from the American Psychiatric 
Association “for arriving at a psychiatric diagnosis without first having 
examined the individuals in question, and for indicating, while testifying 
in court as an expert witness, he could predict with 100% certainty that 
 
 78. Id. at 887. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Amnesty Int’l website, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510282003 (20 
February 2003). Dr. Grigson is profiled in Errol Morris’s documentary film, THE THIN BLUE LINE 
(BFI/Third Floor/American Playhouse 1988). 
 81. Jonathan Sorensen & James Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-
Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CH. 743, 749 (1990-91). 
 82. James Marquart et al., Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict 
Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 449, 458 (1989). 
 83. Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty, 1973-
1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 23 (1994), 
 84. Id. at 22. 
 85. Marquart, supra note 82, at 461-62. 
 86. Amnesty Int’l website, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510282003 (20 
February 2003). 
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the individuals would engage in future violent acts.”87 Nevertheless, 
Thomas Barefoot was sentenced to death rather than life based on this 
man’s testimony. Dr. Grigson still testifies for the state of Texas despite 
his expulsion from the psychiatric ranks,88 but he has spawned a 
“growing entourage of Grigson-like psychiatrists acting as hired guns for 
the state.”89 
As Jurek had already determined the admissibility of future 
dangerousness predictions as a matter of constitutionality, it was left for 
Barefoot to validate their admissibility as an evidentiary issue. Would 
the Court use the Frye90 “general acceptance” test, a liberal 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,91 or some other rule? 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) weighed in on the issue 
with an amicus curiae brief which, somewhat surprisingly it may seem, 
argued against admitting psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness. 
The APA argued that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness 
were extremely unreliable: 
Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction concerning 
the long-term future dangerousness of a defendant in a capital case, at 
least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports to be 
testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in this 
area. Although psychiatric assessments may permit short-term 
predictions of violent or assaultive behavior, medical knowledge has 
simply not advanced to the point where long-term predictions—the 
type of testimony at issue in this case—may be made with even 
reasonable accuracy. The large body of research in this area indicates 
that, even under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-
term future dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three 
cases.92 
In addition, the APA argued that if such predictions did have to be 
made, the psychiatrist ought at least to examine the defendant personally 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 30 (as modified May 22, 2003), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20of% 
20denial/Chap3.pdf. 
 89. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 81, at 749. 
 90. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert testimony 
based on a scientific principle is admissible only if the principle is “sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”). 
 91. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (revised 2000). 
 92. APA Brief, supra note 4, at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
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before making the prediction.93 Personal examination, however, would 
not have made a difference in any of Dr. Grigson’s court appearances, it 
seems, as he always predicted, whether he had examined a defendant or 
not, that that person would be violent again.94 Perhaps the only 
prediction that could be made with certainty was that Dr. Grigson, a 
sociopath who showed no remorse, would kill again, using “junk 
science”95 as his weapon. 
As Professor John Monahan, one of the leading legal experts in the 
field of future dangerousness jurisprudence, has noted, “[r]arely have 
research data been as quickly or nearly universally accepted by the 
academic and professional communities as those supporting the 
proposition that mental health professionals are highly inaccurate at 
predicting violent behavior.”96 Indeed, the statement has the ring of truth 
because it is apparently a statement against interest. Psychiatrists as a 
group were admitting their own shortcomings as predictors of future 
violence and urging that members of their profession such as Dr. 
Grigson forego the lucrative expert witness fees they could receive for 
their services. Surely, one supposes, a group that is willing to diminish 
its members’ incomes for the sake of truth must be operating in the 
interests of justice. 
While the APA is, in my opinion, correct that psychiatrists are not 
very accurate in predicting future dangerousness,97 the APA Brief is not 
quite the statement against interest that it seems to be. The APA Brief 
emerged in the shadow of a 1976 California Supreme Court case, 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.98 That court held that a 
psychotherapist has a duty of care to protect the intended victim of a 
patient who presents a serious danger of violence.99 If psychiatrists were 
to claim a high degree of accuracy in determining who presents a serious 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, 
and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 155-61 (1977). 
 95. The phrase was coined by HUBER, supra note 1. 
 96. John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques 
(1981), quoted in Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? Future Dangerousness: The 
Testimony of Experts in Capital Cases, 3 WTR CRIM. JUST. 18, 21 (1989). 
 97. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun states that the evidence establishing the 
unreliability of psychiatric long-term predictions is “overwhelming.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He cites over a dozen authorities for this proposition, see id. at 919, 919 
n.2, and notes that neither the majority nor the state of Texas has cited a single reputable scientific 
source refuting the conclusion that psychiatric predictions of future violence are wrong more often 
than right. Id. at 919. 
 98. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 99. Id. at 340. 
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danger of violence, their responsibility in such cases would be increased. 
This would often leave them in the excruciating position of having to 
choose between violating doctor-patient confidentiality and suffering 
civil liability for their patients’ actions. If, on the other hand, 
psychiatrists by their own admission are no better than anyone else at 
predicting dangerousness, why should they be held to a higher duty of 
care in protecting the intended victims of their patients? Liability in 
negligence cases, after all, hinges on the defendant’s ability to foresee 
possible harm to a plaintiff.100 If one can’t predict with any certainty, 
how can one foresee; hence, how can one be liable? Thus, the APA’s 
position on future dangerousness predictions acted as a self-protecting 
disclaimer in the context of the Tarasoff duty to warn. 
While there is ample underlying research to justify the APA’s 
position, it may be a matter of policy as well as science. This may 
explain why the APA still contends that “[p]sychiatrists have no special 
knowledge or ability with which to predict dangerous behavior. Studies 
have shown that even with patients in which there is a history of violent 
acts, predictions of future violence will be wrong for two out of every 
three patients.”101 This is despite the fact that it has been estimated that, 
today, psychiatrists’ ability to predict dangerousness may have improved 
to the point that “clinicians are able to distinguish violent from 
nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of 
accuracy.”102 Still, this hardly brings clinical accuracy to the level of 
reliability that one might wish when a human being’s life is in the 
balance. 
The Supreme Court in Barefoot could have taken any one of at least 
three possible approaches to the admission of psychiatric testimony. It 
could have chosen reliability as the keynote to admissibility, in which 
case the psychiatric one-out-of-three average would not have made the 
grade. It could have used the Frye general acceptance test,103 in which 
case the APA Brief, representing as it did the general attitude among the 
psychiatric profession, would also have kept Grigson’s testimony out. 
The Court instead chose to follow a liberal interpretation of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702: as long as the testimony was relevant, and helpful to 
the trier of fact, it was admissible. 
 
 100. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 101. APA Statement on Prediction of Dangerousness, quoted in APA FactSHEET on Violence 
and Mental Illness, APA website, http://www.psych.org (2000). 
 102. Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 
62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 783, 790 (1994). 
 103. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
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Barefoot made three arguments against the constitutionality of the 
psychiatric testimony that had been entered against him: (1) that 
psychiatrists in general are not competent to predict future 
dangerousness with any reliability (a point that the APA Brief makes 
difficult to contest), (2) that psychiatrists should not be allowed to make 
future dangerousness predictions based on hypothetical questions 
without having examined the defendant personally, and (3) that the 
testimony of the two psychiatrists in this case was so unreliable that the 
sentence should be set aside.104 The Supreme Court, with Justice White 
writing for the majority, rejected all three arguments.105 
The Court rejected the first argument—that psychiatrists in general 
are not competent to predict future dangerousness with any reliability—
because it had already, by implication, rejected it in Jurek.106 Never 
mind that psychiatric testimony was not offered in that case.107 Never 
mind that the issue of the reliability of psychiatric testimony had not 
been briefed or argued. The Court had said that all relevant information 
should be admissible108 and that was that. When the Court said “relevant 
information,” that must have included psychiatric evidence, no matter 
how unreliable—not that they’d really thought about it at the time. In 
other words, the Barefoot Court unblinkingly considered the question of 
admissibility of psychiatric testimony to have been decided in Jurek, 
though the specific issue had not been before the Court in that case. 
The Court fell back on its hypothesis (I hesitate to use the word 
“reasoning”) in Jurek that if it eliminated future dangerousness 
prediction in death sentencing, it might have to get rid of it in other areas 
of the law.109 Again, no attempt was made to distinguish between capital 
sentencing and other kinds of legal judgment. The Court cites a 
statement by Professor Monahan that “there may be circumstances in 
which prediction is both empirically possible and ethically 
appropriate,”110 without catching on to the very narrow and tentative 
nature of the statement. Yes, there may be some situations in which 
prediction is ethical and appropriate, but that does not mean it is 
therefore ethical and appropriate in all situations. The Court fails to pick 
up the hint from Monahan that prediction could be held to be appropriate 
 
 104. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 896-97. 
 107. Id. at 897. 
 108. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276. 
 109. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897. 
 110. Id. at 899 n.7, quoting JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR, at v (1981). 
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in some contexts but not others. 
This hint would have been most useful to the Court if it wanted to 
reconsider one of its main premises, namely, that if lay people are 
allowed to make predictions of future dangerousness, then why 
shouldn’t psychiatrists—people who are trained in the study of human 
behavior—be able to make such predictions.111 The Court might have 
said that when it comes to the death penalty, no one, layman or 
psychiatrist, should be able to make predictions about future 
dangerousness. But the Court had already decided in Jurek that they 
could.112 
The majority answered the problem of the unreliability of 
psychiatric testimony with a determined faith that the adversarial system 
would sort it all out: 
Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not 
only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so 
unreliable that it should be ignored. If the jury may make up its mind 
about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors 
should not be barred from hearing the views of the State’s psychiatrists 
along with opposing views of the defendant’s doctors.113 
In other words, if the state presents an expert witness saying the 
defendant will commit future acts of violence, the defense can simply 
present expert witnesses who say that the state’s witnesses are mistaken, 
or that they are quacks. Then the jury can try to make sense of it all. The 
Court quotes with approval the district court’s114 analysis of the role of 
the jury vis-à-vis expert witnesses: 
[T]he differences among the experts were quantitative, not qualitative. 
The differences in opinion go to the weight [of the evidence] and not 
the admissibility of such testimony . . . . Such disputes are within the 
province of the jury to resolve. Indeed, it is a fundamental premise of 
our entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the jury 
is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important matters 
from the unimportant matters, and, when called upon to do so, to give 
greater credence to one party’s expert witnesses than another’s. Such 
matters occur routinely in the American judicial system, both civil and 
 
 111. Id. at 896-97. 
 112. Id. at 896. 
 113. Id. at 898-99. 
 114. Barefoot’s case reached the Supreme Court through the habeas corpus route, as an 
application for stay of execution, which was treated (and granted) as a petition for writ of certiorari, 
rather than through the ordinary certiorari route. Barefoot v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983); Id. at 
885-87. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/2
REGNIER1.DOC 4/26/2004  11:04 AM 
2004] BAREFOOT IN QUICKSAND 487 
criminal.115 
A jury’s job is to decide matters of fact. Admittedly, this sometimes 
involves speculation about the future. For example, in the damages 
phase of a wrongful death suit, a jury might decide how much money the 
decedent would have earned in his life if he had not been killed at, say, 
age thirty-four. In such a case, a jury can extrapolate a reasonable figure 
based on the decedent’s skill, training, and past earnings. The result will 
always be, at best, an educated guess, but some kind of estimate is 
necessary in order to compensate the victim’s family. But prediction of a 
murderer’s future dangerousness is a much more uncertain proposition 
because the vast majority of murderers do not kill again and, in fact, 
have a tendency not to commit further violent crimes.116 Besides, being 
able to permit a certain amount of speculation in matters involving 
money damages does not mean we can allow the same degree of 
uncertainty in matters involving a person’s liberty. Even less should we 
tolerate such uncertainty when a person’s life is at stake. 
The majority notes, however, that Barefoot offered no evidence at 
trial to rebut Drs. Holbrook and Grigson.117 The Court implies that this 
must have been the defense’s fault because Texas law provided a $500 
budget for indigent defendants such as Barefoot to use for purposes of 
investigation and expert testimony.118 The Court does not consider 
whether this might be enough to pay for the services of an expert witness 
to rebut the two psychiatrists, especially when it is supposed to cover 
costs of investigation as well. Here again, the Court does not even 
address the possible due process violation. But how fair can the 
“adversarial” process be when one side (the state) has nearly unlimited 
resources with which to retain expert witnesses, while the defense has 
only $500? 
In addition, the district court had said, “[t]he majority of psychiatric 
experts agree that where there is a pattern of repetitive assaultive and 
violent conduct, the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of future 
dangerousness dramatically rises,”119 but that court did not make it clear 
that the improved accuracy did not apply to clinical predictions, but to 
predictions based on statistical analysis. As the APA stated: “To the 
extent such predictions have any validity, they can only be made on the 
 
 115. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 902. 
 116. See Michael L. Radelet & James W. Marquart, Assessing Nondangerousness During 
Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 54 ALB. L. REV. 845, 854-55 (1990). 
 117. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 n.5. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 902. 
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basis of essentially actuarial data to which psychiatrists, qua 
psychiatrists, can bring no special interpretative skills.”120 
The Supreme Court opinion admits that neither Barefoot nor the 
APA “suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future 
dangerousness, only most of the time.”121 Well, that’s a relief. 
Apparently, the Court has some standards. If one is sometimes right, his 
testimony is admissible. Is this a hint that the Court might be so rigorous 
as to exclude testimony that is always wrong? 
But while the Court seems to be basing much of its decision on 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, it misses the opportunity to apply Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403, which states that relevant evidence “may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”122 
All this time that the Court has been looking at relevance, it has ignored 
the question of the evidence’s probative value. How probative is expert 
testimony that is wrong two-thirds of the time? More specifically, in the 
context of the Texas death penalty statute, how probative is expert 
testimony that is wrong two-thirds of the time when it is being offered to 
establish a matter that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?  In 
other words, when the standard of proof is that high, how can evidence 
so unreliable even be considered to make a meaningful contribution 
towards a resolution? In the context of capital sentencing, courts should 
be especially wary of the dangers of unfair prejudice. And when the 
evidence presented has such a high probability of being wrong, its 
probative value would seem to be not just outweighed by the chance of 
unfair prejudice, but substantially outweighed, as FRE 403 requires. As 
the APA said: 
[T]he use of psychiatric testimony on this issue causes serious 
prejudice to the defendant.  By dressing up the actuarial data with an 
“expert” opinion, the psychiatrist’s testimony is likely to receive undue 
weight.  In addition, it permits the jury to avoid the difficult actuarial 
questions by seeking refuge in a medical diagnosis that provides a false 
aura of certainty.  For these reasons, psychiatric testimony on future 
dangerousness impermissibly distorts the fact-finding process in 
capital cases.123 
The Court rejected Barefoot’s second argument—that psychiatrists 
 
 120. APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9. 
 121. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 900. 
 122. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 123. APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9. 
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should not be allowed to make future dangerousness predictions based 
on hypothetical questions, without having examined the defendant 
personally124—on similar grounds to those on which it rejected 
Barefoot’s first argument. The use of hypotheticals rather than a clinical 
examination went to the weight of the evidence rather than its 
admissibility.125 Hypotheticals are standard evidentiary procedure, and 
the Court saw no reason why this should change just because the death 
penalty was involved.126 Let the jury sort it out. 
Finally, the Court dismissed Barefoot’s third argument, that the 
testimony of the two psychiatrists in this case was so unreliable that the 
sentence should be set aside.127 Barefoot argued that the hypothetical 
questions given to the two psychiatrists used controverted facts.128 The 
Court responded that Barefoot’s attorney, on cross-examination, could 
have propounded a set of hypothetical facts in conformity with 
Barefoot’s theory of the case.129 
In its conclusion the majority said that to agree with Barefoot’s 
position would seriously undermine and, in effect, overrule Jurek,130 
which appears by this time to have achieved the status of sacred cow. 
This hardly seems an accurate rendition of that case, however. Jurek 
established that, as a constitutional matter, future dangerousness 
predictions could be used in death penalty sentencing. It said that all 
“relevant information” could be adduced but didn’t delve into what was 
relevant or how other rules of evidence, such as FRE 403, might apply. 
It did not address the issue of admissibility of psychiatric testimony 
because that issue wasn’t raised. Barefoot went beyond Jurek by holding 
that psychiatric testimony was admissible as long as it was relevant—
even if it was inaccurate, even if it was based on hypotheticals rather 
than examination, even if those hypotheticals were based on disputed 
facts—and by rejecting consideration of the reliability of the testimony 
or general acceptance of the principles underlying it. 
 
 124. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896. 
 125. Id. at 904, citing Barefoot, 596 S.W.2d at 887. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 896. 
 128. Id. at 905. 
 129. Id. at 905 n.10. 
 130. Id. at 906. 
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III.  MINORITY REPORT:131 BLACKMUN’S PIQUE 
In a positively livid dissent to the Barefoot decision, Justice 
Blackmun,132 joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, fumes: “In the 
present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me.”133 To 
Blackmun, the fact that it is a capital case clearly does make a 
difference: “One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money 
damages, but when a person’s life is at stake—no matter how heinous 
his offense–a requirement of greater reliability should prevail.”134 
After a quick survey of the “overwhelming” scientific evidence 
(unrebutted by the majority or the state of Texas) on the unreliability of 
psychiatric predictions,135 Blackmun hones in on the difference, noted by 
the APA, between clinical predictions and statistical predictions.136 The 
statistical predictions are usable by laymen and are possibly more 
accurate than the psychiatrists’ clinical predictions.137 While psychiatric 
predictions may be more reliable where there is a pattern of repetitive 
assault and violent conduct, says Blackmun, “psychiatrists have no 
special insights to add to this actuarial fact, and a single violent crime 
cannot provide a basis for a reliable prediction of future violence.”138 
Psychiatrists may be less accurate predictors than laymen because they 
would prefer to have someone wrongly incarcerated or executed than be 
held liable for later violence committed by that individual.139 Blackmun 
argues that there was no reliable trial testimony that Barefoot had 
committed acts of violence other than the crime for which he was being 
tried, only testimony that he had a bad reputation for peaceable and law 
abiding conduct.140 “A death sentence cannot rest on highly dubious 
predictions secretly based on a factual foundation of hearsay and pure 
 
 131. The recent film MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks LLC/Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. 2002) is relevant to the subject of future dangerousness. There, in a futuristic society, law 
enforcement officials are able to predict murders reliably and thereby prevent them from happening. 
The police then arrest the would-be murderers as if they had actually succeeded in their intended 
crimes. In an early scene in the film, a law enforcement officer arrests a man for the “future murder” 
of his wife. The arrestee protests, “I didn’t do anything,” to no avail, as he is led away in shackles. 
 132. Note that Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 279 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 133. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 920-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 921-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 922 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 922 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 922 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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conjecture.”141 
Blackmun demonstrates that Jurek is not the only case that can be 
used as precedent. He cites Jurek’s companion case, Gregg, for the 
proposition that “accurate sentencing information is an indispensable 
prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall 
live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a 
sentencing decision.”142 He cites Woodson, another companion case to 
Jurek, on the qualitative difference between the death penalty and any 
other punishment. “Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination 
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”143 Blackmun 
echoes the APA’s point that jurors are likely to invest psychiatrists with 
greater infallibility on the subject of future violence than they actually 
have.144 He quotes Imwinkelried on the “aura” surrounding scientific 
experts in jurors’ minds: 
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is 
more accurate and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of 
scientific evidence visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise 
measurement, of findings arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In 
short, in the mind of the typical lay juror, a scientific witness has a 
special aura of credibility.145 
Blackmun points out that because juries may overestimate the probative 
value of polygraph evidence, it is usually excluded from trials despite 
what he calls conservative estimates that it is accurate 80 to 90 percent 
of the time when administered by experienced examiners.146 
Next, Blackmun argues against the majority’s undue faith that the 
adversarial process will do justice in such circumstances.147 Cross-
examination may not reveal the flaws in psychiatric testimony, says 
Blackmun, because such predictions are often based on subjective 
factors.148 Suppose, for example, that a psychiatrist claims an ability to 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190, cited in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 143. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305, cited in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 144. APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9. 
 145. Edward Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific 
Evidence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 37 (E. Imwinkelried ed. 1981), cited in 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 928 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 146. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: 
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 736 (1974), cited in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 
930 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 147. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 929-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. at  931-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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make predictions based on his many years of clinical experience. If the 
psychiatrist says that a defendant shows many of the same symptoms as 
patients who later became violent and that, in his opinion, the defendant 
will likely be violent, what is a defense attorney to do? Grill the 
psychiatrist on all his past patients who had similar symptoms? 
Challenge the psychiatrist’s sincerity in stating his clinical opinion? The 
following exchange shows what a slippery customer a clever psychiatrist 
like Dr. Grigson could be on cross examination. In the Ernest Smith, Jr. 
trial, Dr. Grigson testified on direct examination that the defendant was a 
“severe sociopath” with no conscience and no regard for other people’s 
lives or property, and was likely to commit future acts of violence.149 On 
cross, the defense counsel tried to establish that Grigson was 
prosecution-oriented: 
Q.  On how many occasions do you think that you have ever testified 
for anybody other than the District Attorney’s Office? 
A.  Well, I never testify for anybody. I only testify as to what my 
findings are. Usually, if the Defense Attorney likes what I have 
found, they [sic] call me. If the District Attorney’s Office—well, 
usually they call me whether they like it or dislike it. I never testify 
for anybody.150 
Note here how this thoroughly pro-prosecution witness manages to pass 
himself off as neutral and to imply that prosecutors are more likely than 
defense lawyers to be interested in his testimony whether it goes for their 
case or against it. When defense lawyers have tried to impeach Dr. 
Grigson with the APA’s condemnation of his testimony, Dr. Grigson has 
deflected such attacks by saying that he is the preeminent mental health 
expert on the criminal mind and that the APA is just a group of East 
Coast liberals who oppose the death penalty and think “queers are 
normal.”151 
Finally, Blackmun attacks the adequacy of the adversarial system to 
get to the truth in matters related to a person’s mental state.152 He quotes 
then-Chief Justice Burger, in a statement Burger wrote before he was on 
the Court: 
The very nature of the adversary system . . . complicates the use of 
scientific opinion evidence, particularly in the field of psychiatry. This 
system of partisan contention, of attack and counterattack, at its best is 
 
 149. Dix, supra note 94, at 157-58. 
 150. Id. at 159 (quoting Smith Transcript at 2948-49). 
 151. Ron Rosenbaum, Travels with Dr. Death, VANITY FAIR 141, 168, 147 (May 1990). 
 152. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at  931-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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not ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait or profile of the 
human personality, especially in the area of abnormal behavior.153 
Blackmun expands on this point to observe that where one expert tells 
jurors that he knows a defendant will commit violent acts, while an 
opposing expert tells them that no one can predict who will be violent, 
the jurors are more likely to believe the expert who speaks with 
certainty, as this will be more helpful to them in performing their 
duty.154 He expresses concern that jurors’ attention will be drawn to the 
sideshow of experts and away from the individualized sentencing that 
the Eighth Amendment requires.155 
IV.  BLACKMUN’S REVENGE: DAUBERT CHANGES EVERYTHING 
– OR DOES IT? 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted in Barefoot, was the 
laissez faire rule on admissibility of expert testimony. Federal judges 
didn’t have to worry much about screening expert testimony. Usually, as 
long as it was relevant, they could let it in and the jury would decide 
what to do with it. Some Circuits, such as the Ninth, however, still used 
the Frye general acceptance test for screening scientific testimony. But 
in 1993, the Daubert case156 seemed to change everything. Unlike Jurek 
and Barefoot, Daubert was not a criminal case, and it had nothing to do 
with psychiatric testimony. It was a civil case in which children born 
with birth defects sued the manufacturer of Bendectin, an anti-morning 
sickness drug, claiming that Bendectin was the cause of their 
deformities.157 More than thirty published studies on Bendectin 
involving 130,000 patients had failed to find that the drug caused birth 
defects.158 The children produced heavily credentialed experts of their 
own, though the experts’ findings had not been published and peer 
reviewed.159 The district court, applying the general acceptance test, 
refused to admit the children’s experts and granted summary judgment 
to the drug manufacturer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Frye.160 The 
 
 153. Warren Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Court, 28 FED. PROB. 3, 6 (1964), cited in 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 932-33. 
 154. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 934-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 156. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 157. Id. at 582. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 583. 
 160. Id. at 584. 
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U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.161 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, clarified a question that 
scholars had puzzled over since 1975, namely, did the Federal Rules of 
Evidence on expert testimony supersede the Frye test, or were they 
meant to co-exist with it?162 The Court said (unanimously on at least this 
particular point) that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.163 
It interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to mandate a liberal standard 
of relevance.164 Up to this point, it sounds as if nothing has changed 
since Barefoot. 
But, wait! This is Blackmun writing, remember? Suddenly, in a part 
of the opinion that gets only a 7-to-2 majority, he writes, “under the 
Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”165 Reliable! Shades 
of the Barefoot dissent! Psychiatric predictions of dangerousness would 
never have been admitted if they had to be reliable. This could change 
everything. The Court goes on to hold that the mention of “scientific . . . 
knowledge” in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 implies knowledge that is 
reliable and sets up federal judges as gatekeepers with the assigned task 
of keeping out evidence that is unreliable.166 One can almost picture 
Justice Blackmun getting ready to give Dr. Death the boot when he 
appears at the gate seeking admission. 
Daubert goes on to list a set of factors (illustrative, not definitive) 
that can be used to determine whether proposed scientific testimony is 
indeed scientific (i.e., reliable) knowledge that will be helpful (i.e., 
relevant) to the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in 
issue.167 The Court suggests these factors: (1) Has the theory or 
technique been (or can it be) tested?168 (2) Has the theory or technique 
been subjected to peer review and publication?169 (3) What is the 
technique’s known or potential rate of error?170 (4) Has it been generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific community?171 
While the list of factors does not purport to be exhaustive, it is 
 
 161. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. 
 162. Id. at 586 n.4. 
 163. Id. at 587. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 589. 
 166. Id. at 589-90. 
 167. Id. at 592. 
 168. Id. at 593. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 594. 
 171. Id. 
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instructive to apply it to psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness: 
(1) Have such predictions been tested? Yes, they have, and they have 
been found to be wrong two-thirds of the time.172 (2) Has the theory or 
technique been subject to peer review and publication? Yes, and 
numerous studies have found it to be unreliable.173 (3) What is the 
technique’s known or potential rate of error? See answer to (1) above. 
(4) Has it been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community? 
No, the relevant scientific community has officially rejected it.174 A 
judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has said that 
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness appear to fail all the 
Daubert factors.175 All this means that psychiatric predictions of future 
dangerousness are on their way out, right? Well, not so fast. 
Of course, the state of Texas was not obliged to adopt the Daubert 
rules for admitting scientific testimony just because the federal courts 
had done so. The Supreme Court had propounded an evidentiary 
principle, not a constitutional one; states could still have their own rules 
of evidence. But the Texas evidence rules are patterned after the Federal 
Rules.176 In 1995, in DuPont v. Robinson,177 the Texas Supreme Court in 
essence adopted Daubert, though it added a few wrinkles of its own. In 
addition to the four Daubert factors for determining reliability and 
relevance, the Texas court added: (1) the extent to which the technique 
relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert, and (2) the non-
judicial uses of the theory or technique.178 The first of these new factors 
does not seem to favor psychiatric clinical predictions of future 
dangerousness, which rely a great deal on the doctor’s impressions. 
Predictions based on statistics would be less subjective, except that there 
is always some degree of subjectivity involved in determining the 
characteristics that go into analyzing the statistics (e.g., if asked whether 
a patient has been “violent” in the past, would one count his smashing a 
coffee mug as violence, or would he have had to strike a person to be 
considered violent?). As for the second new factor, there are non-
judicial uses for clinical predictions of future dangerousness. People in 
mental institutions have to make them all the time, though they are 
aware that much of what they are doing is a guess. Still, these new 
 
 172. See APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9. 
 173. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919, 919 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring). 
 176. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 
 177. DuPont v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995). 
 178. Id. at 557. 
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factors, added to the old ones, do not move one very far in the direction 
of wanting to call future dangerousness predictions reliable. Any way 
one slices it, such predictions are still wrong much more often than they 
are right. Under Daubert/Robinson, clinical predictions of future 
dangerousness, would no longer be admissible, one might assume, even 
in Texas. One would be wrong.179 
V.  WAITING FOR KUMHO, FINDING NENNO 
While Federal Rule of Evidence702 applies to “scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge,” Daubert limited its holding to scientific 
knowledge.180 This left open questions about whether Daubert’s 
gatekeeping function and reliability/relevance factors applied to such 
expert witnesses as airplane pilots, beekeepers, real estate appraisers, 
accountants, auto mechanics—all of whom have particular expertise and 
experience that might help a trier of fact, but who are clearly not 
scientists. In 1999, in Kumho,181 the Supreme Court addressed this issue; 
but up until that time, other courts had to confront the question on their 
own. 
In 1998, in Nenno v. State,182 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
again dealt with the question of expert testimony regarding future 
dangerousness in the penalty phase of a capital murder case, this time in 
the light of the Daubert/Robinson test. By this time, article 37.071 of the 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which laid out the sentencing 
procedure for capital murder, had been amended (as of 1991) so that the 
moot-for-all-practical-purposes questions about deliberateness 
(subsection (b)(1)) and provocation (subsection (b)(3)) were 
eliminated.183 Though there were other changes (e.g., mitigating 
 
 179. See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary 
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 910-15 (2000). 
 180. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. 
 181. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 182. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 549. 
 183. The article provides, in pertinent part: 
Sec. 2. . . .  
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the 
following issues to the jury: 
(1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and  
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the 
jury to find the defendant guilty as a party under Sections 7.01 and 7.02, Penal 
Code, whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not 
actually cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another 
or anticipated that a human life would be taken.  
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evidence could be presented on behalf of the defendant184), future 
dangerousness was still a required question at sentencing in capital 
murder cases.185 
Eric Charles Nenno had been found guilty of raping and choking to 
death a seven-year-old girl.186 The state of Texas presented “expert” 
testimony on future dangerousness from Kenneth Lanning, a 
Supervisory Special Agent in the Behavioral Science unit of the FBI, 
who specialized in studying the sexual victimization of children.187 
Based on information given about Nenno, Lanning concluded that he 
was a pedophile and that such a person was difficult to rehabilitate.188 
After being given a lengthy hypothetical matching the facts shown by 
the evidence, Lanning testified that an individual matching the 
hypothetical “would be an extreme threat to society and especially 
children within his age preference.”189 
Citing Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 (identical at the time 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702190), as interpreted in Kelly v. State,191 
Nenno challenged the admissibility of Lanning’s testimony.192 In Kelly, 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Rule 702 required the 
satisfaction of a three-part reliability test before novel scientific evidence 
would be admissible: (1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; 
(2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the 
technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in 
question.193 The court further held that factors relating to this 
determination of reliability include, but are not limited to: (a) acceptance 
by the relevant scientific community, (b) qualifications of the expert, (c) 
literature concerning the technique, (d) the potential rate of error of the 
technique, (e) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the 
technique, (f) the clarity with which the underlying theory or technique 
can be explained to the court, and (g) the experience and skill of the 
 
(c) The state must prove each issue submitted under Subsection (b) of this article beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of “yes” or “no” on each 
issue submitted under Subsection (b) of this Article. 
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1991) (effective September 1, 1991). 
 184. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a)(1) (Vernon 1991). 
 185. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (Vernon 1991). 
 186. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 552. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 560 n.7; FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (revised 2000). 
 191. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
 192. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 560. 
 193. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. 
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person applying the technique.194 The court later held that this inquiry is 
substantively identical to the inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court in 
the federal system in Daubert.195 
But Lanning was not a doctor,196 and the evidence he gave did not 
purport to be scientific evidence.197 So how should Kelly be applied to 
this type of nonscientific (i.e., involving technical or other specialized 
knowledge) testimony?198 The court, in an opinion written by Judge 
Keller,199 presciently anticipated Kumho by saying that Daubert’s 
gatekeeping function applied to all forms of expert testimony.200 It added 
that the four factors in Daubert do not necessarily apply outside the 
“hard science” context, but could vary depending on the field of 
expertise.201 The court did not attempt to draw a bright line between 
“hard” and “soft” sciences, or nonscientific testimony, and admitted that 
the distinction might often be blurred.202 It did, however, speak of fields 
apart from the hard sciences, “such as the social sciences or fields that 
are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the 
scientific method.”203 By now, one can see the end-run around the 
gatekeeper coming. Partly, it is accomplished by the fact that the expert 
witness is not a doctor. This may seem to satisfy Blackmun’s and the 
APA’s complaint that having a doctor testify on future dangerousness 
gives the testimony an unwarranted aura of credibility. Conceding that 
prediction of future dangerousness is not a “science” lessens the 
standard under which it is admitted. 
Thus, in Nenno, the court held that Kelly’s reliability requirement 
applied, but with less rigor, to soft science and nonscientific fields.204 
The court formulated a new set of criteria for such fields: 
(1) whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2) whether the 
subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that 
field, and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon 
and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field. These questions are 
merely an appropriately tailored translation of the Kelly test to areas 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
 196. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 552, 562. 
 197. Id. at 560. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 551. 
 200. Id. at 561. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 560-61. 
 203. Id. at 561. 
 204. Id. 
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outside of hard science. And, hard science methods of validation, such 
as assessing the potential rate of error or subjecting a theory to peer 
review, may often be inappropriate for testing the reliability of fields 
of expertise outside the hard sciences.205 
The court next applied this test to expert-witness Lanning’s 
testimony. Lanning stated that his analysis was based on his experience 
studying the sexual victimization of children for fifteen years full-time 
and eight years part-time prior to that.206 He had been with the FBI for 
over twenty-five years, and had been with a Behavioral Science Unit of 
the FBI Academy for fifteen years.207 He did not claim that he had a 
particular methodology for assessing future dangerousness.208 The court 
stated that research concerning the behavior of offenders who sexually 
victimize children appeared to be a legitimate field of expertise: 
“Through interviews, case studies, and statistical research, a person may 
acquire, as a result of such experience, superior knowledge concerning 
the behavior of such offenders.”209 The court found that Lanning’s 
testimony showed that future dangerousness was a subject that often 
surfaced during the course of research in the field of child 
victimization.210 Lanning testified that he had studied more than a 
thousand cases that concerned future dangerousness in some way.211 His 
research included personally interviewing inmates convicted of child sex 
offenses, examining the inmates’ psychological records, and examining 
the facts of the offenses involved.212 
Nenno complained about the lack of peer review of Lanning’s 
technique.213 “But the absence of peer review,” the court responded, 
“does not necessarily undercut the reliability of the testimony presented 
here. To the extent that a factfinder could decide that the absence of peer 
review cast doubt on the credibility of the testimony, such affects the 
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”214 The court found 
Lanning’s testimony to be sufficiently reliable under Rule 702.215 How is 
this any different from Barefoot? What makes Lanning’s testimony any 
 
 205. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561. 
 206. Id. at 562 n.10. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 562. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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more reliable than Dr. Death’s? Application of Daubert makes no 
difference, it would seem, where future dangerousness is concerned. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ superficial analysis shows 
just how weak its new reliability test is. The first question is the vague 
one of whether the field is “legitimate.” So, what do we mean by 
“legitimate,” and what is the difference between that and “reliable”? 
Presumably, rocket science is legitimate and tarot cards are not, but how 
do we judge all the soft and semi-soft sciences in the middle? The court 
concludes that the study of child victimization is a legitimate field 
because it utilizes such techniques as interviews, case studies, and 
statistical research.216 These are certainly valid research methods, and 
Lanning would appear to be eminently qualified to talk about the subject 
of child victimization ad nauseam. But does one’s knowledge about 
child victimization cases qualify one to make predictions about a 
person’s future behavior? Before we listen to such predictions, shouldn’t 
we be told what bases (I’m not even going so far as to ask for 
“principles”) the expert uses to make his predictions? Wouldn’t it be 
helpful to know how accurate the expert’s predictions have been in the 
past? This is something that can be tested: How many times in the past 
did Lanning make a prediction about someone’s future dangerousness, 
and how often was he right? Is that too rigorous a test to require, even 
for a soft science? The court says that potential rate of error may not be 
appropriate for assessing the reliability of fields outside the hard 
sciences,217 but it gives no reason why such information would be 
inappropriate here. Indeed, it seems it would be highly relevant. Why not 
a general acceptance test: What does the APA, for example think about 
Lanning’s future dangerousness predictions? What about the 
Daubert/Robinson factor of the expert’s subjectivity?218 Isn’t Lanning 
ultimately just giving us his “gut feeling?” While I agree that not all 
Daubert factors must necessarily be applied to so-called soft sciences, 
there is no need to jettison them all when several of them might 
reasonably be asked and would be most useful in gauging reliability. 
In short, the court does an ipse dixit on the first question of its 
three-part test (whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one), in 
effect saying, “Is it legitimate? Yes.” It skimps on the second and third 
parts. Regarding the second prong (whether the subject matter of the 
expert’s testimony is within the scope of the field), the court never 
 
 216. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 562. 
 217. Id. at 561. 
 218. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. 
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explains how Lanning’s expertise in child victimization puts his 
testimony on future dangerousness within the scope of that field. The 
court does not say whether Lanning has had to make predictions on 
future dangerousness as part of his job or if he has merely studied other 
people’s predictions. As for the third prong of the test (whether the 
expert’s testimony properly relies on or utilizes the principles involved 
in the field), the court never addresses this because it never establishes 
that there are any principles on which Lanning is basing his testimony. 
For all one can glean from the opinion, Lanning’s testimony amounts to 
saying, in effect, “I’ve studied thousands of child victimizers who 
committed similar crimes later on, and Mr. Nenno certainly reminds me 
of them.” The court never even says what Lanning considers the telling 
characteristics of a repeat child victimizer to be. 
Future dangerousness predictions in death penalty cases are alive 
and well in Texas.219 When the Kumho decision came down from the 
U.S. Supreme Court a year after Nenno, it left the Daubert reliability test 
so flexible that it did nothing to upset the test established in Nenno.220 
The Kumho Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, clarified that 
Daubert’s gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert testimony, not just 
scientific testimony.221 The Court reiterated that the purpose of the 
gatekeeping role was to ensure the reliability and relevance of expert 
testimony while still giving trial courts considerable leeway in deciding 
how to assess reliability; courts were not bound to use the Daubert 
factors but could improvise their own sets of tests to determine 
reliability.222 As the Court had already held in Joiner that a trial court’s 
 
 219. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 596-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (finding 
harmless error where state dismissed juror for cause because she would require proof of another 
murder or attempted murder before finding appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would pose a continuing threat to society); Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2003) (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at punishment to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would probably commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society); Reyes v. State, 84 
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming exclusion of pro-defendant psychologist’s 
testimony on mitigating factors regarding future dangerousness); Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 
378, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (affirming admission of psychiatric testimony on defendant’s 
future dangerousness despite lack of Miranda warnings before psychiatrists interviewed defendant). 
 220. Nenno was cited as precedent in Hernandez v. State, 53 S.W.3d 742, 748-50 (Tex. App. 
2001) (admitting testimony on Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome where expert had not 
conducted any studies or published any articles, did not know the potential error rate of her opinion, 
but testified that her opinions were based on experience, observation, and training, and was 
unimpeached in her assertion that her data and opinions were recognized by the general community 
of psychology and psychiatry). 
 221. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. 
 222. Id. at 152-53. 
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decision whether to exclude expert testimony would be reviewed on an 
“abuse of discretion” standard rather than a de novo standard,223 this left 
a great deal of freedom (or, to view it from a different angle, an utter 
lack of guidance) to federal district court judges in exercising their 
gatekeeping function. Kumho proved so congenial to already-existing 
Texas law that it was cited approvingly in Texas evidentiary case law the 
month after it was decided.224 Thus, there is nothing standing in the way 
of Texas judges who wish to admit psychiatric, or other, testimony on 
future dangerousness in the sentencing phase of death penalty cases. 
VI.  KANGAROO COURT 
In my opinion, future dangerousness predictions should not be 
admitted in the penalty phases of capital cases, no matter how reliable 
they might eventually become. If “due process” means anything, it 
should mean that one may not be put to death based on speculation about 
his future conduct, no matter how reasonable the speculation. As a 
person has a right not to be deprived of life without due process of 
law,225 the presumption is in favor of life, and the state should have to 
surmount a very high hurdle to overcome that presumption. Where, on 
the other hand, future predictions are used to spare a life, the state’s 
burden is lower, since the state is acting in favor of the presumption of 
life. Declining, for example, to execute a prisoner based on doctors’ 
diagnoses that he has a short time to live would not be an abuse of future 
prediction because the benefit of the doubt goes toward preserving life. 
Even if future dangerousness predictions do not fail the 
constitutional due process test, they still fail on evidentiary principles 
because they violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that 
relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury.”226 When one profession, the psychiatric 
community, maintains that there is overwhelming evidence that clinical 
predictions of future dangerousness are unreliable, and where a 
particular clinician, such as Dr. Grigson, has been found in empirical 
studies to be highly inaccurate, it is a sad miscarriage of justice for a 
judge to allow Grigson or a Grigson-like clone to get on the witness 
stand and claim that he can predict future dangerousness with any degree 
 
 223. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997). 
 224. See Godsey v. State, 989 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 225. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 226. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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of certainty. This misleads the jury by presenting pure speculation as 
verifiable fact. It is “prejudicial beyond belief,”227 to the defendant 
because it unfairly characterizes him as a monster who must be 
destroyed. 
There is a great deal that is questionable about the way capital 
punishment is administered in Texas.228 Since the death penalty was 
reinstated in 1976, the state of Texas has carried out over one-third of 
the executions in the United States (321 out of 907, as of April 2, 
2004).229 There tends to be a carnival atmosphere during Texas 
executions: revelers chant death slogans, buy death penalty souvenirs, 
drink beer, and cheer outside the place of execution until they are 
hoarse.230 As of January 1, 2004, Texas had 458 prisoners on death 
row,231 so it appears there will be no end to the festivities. If Texas is so 
in love with capital punishment that it must have it, let it base the death 
penalty entirely, as other states do, on a defendant’s past, provable 
actions. The irony is that Texas would not need its “future 
dangerousness” factor to execute murderers such as Barefoot (who killed 
a policeman), Jurek, and Nenno (both rapists and murderers of children). 
Their crimes would bring on the death penalty under the sentencing 
schemes of many other states.232 What is disturbing is that less culpable 
defendants may be executed due to the foreordained nature of the 
proceedings.233 One study showed that, between 1974 and 1988, Texas 
juries voted for the death penalty in 77% of capital murder cases.234 In 
Georgia, by contrast, a defendant convicted of capital murder has only 
slightly more than a 50-50 chance of getting the death penalty.235 In 
Texas, the death penalty is likely to turn on the highly unreliable 
testimony of a pro-prosecution witness who is predicting the future. 
 
 227. Smith, 534 S.W.2d at 905 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 228. See generally, e.g., Newton, supra note 83; TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 88, 
available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20of%20denial (providing a critique of the Texas 
system). But see generally Goldberg, supra note 36 (providing a defense of the Texas system). 
 229. Death Penalty Information Center website, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php? 
scid=8&did=186 (last updated April 2, 2004). 
 230. See Newton, supra note 83, at 4-5. 
 231. Death Penalty Information Center website, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php? 
scid=9&did=188#state (as of January 1, 2004). 
 232. See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 37, at 84. 
 233. I oppose the death penalty on philosophical, not merely constitutional or practical, 
grounds, though this topic is outside the scope of this article. I mention it merely to reveal my bias 
and to emphasize that I am not advocating the death penalty; I am merely urging that, where it is 
used, the sentencing procedure should be such that the outcome is not predetermined. 
 234. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 81, at 769. 
 235. Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1340-41 (1985). 
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Use of future dangerousness predictions seems particularly 
unnecessary when the choice being made is between the death sentence 
and life in prison without parole. Proponents of the current system argue 
that inflicting the death penalty on potentially violent criminals protects 
other inmates and prison officials from risk of violence.236 But this 
theory ignores research showing that murderers are extremely unlikely 
to murder again while in prison.237 A study of all homicides in state and 
federal prisons in 1973 found that 99.8% of prisoners convicted of 
murder do not murder again while in prison.238 If one could reliably 
identify the 0.2% of convicted murderers who will murder in prison, one 
could save some inmates’ lives; but, as we have seen, there is no reliable 
method for determining which murderers will kill again.239 And, 
counterintuitive as it may seem, research indicates that, among all 
convicted felons, murderers are the best parole risks.240 A study of New 
York parolees over a ten-year period showed a much lower recidivism 
rate among murderers (7.2% were convicted of the same or a lesser 
offense) than among other offenders (20.3% were convicted of similar 
offenses).241 
VII.  RE-THINKING EXPERT TESTIMONY 
The ability of future dangerousness testimony to survive seemingly 
radical changes in evidentiary policies demonstrates the lack of rigor in 
the new approaches. The Daubert/Kumho rule is so flexible that it allows 
loopholes which admit even the testimony of a Dr. Grigson, despite his 
expulsion from the APA. I sympathize with such commentators as Paul 
S. Milich,242 Adina Schwartz,243 and Peter Huber,244 who prefer the Frye 
rule, or some improved version of it. The basic insight of Frye, which 
requires general acceptance in the scientific community,245 is that there 
 
 236. Goldberg & Blum, supra note 36, at 130. 
 237. Radelet & Marquart, supra note 116, at 855. 
 238. Wendy Phillips Wolfson, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty upon Prison Murder, 
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 159, 160 (Hugo Bedau ed., 1982). 
 239. Id. at 170. 
 240. Radelet & Marquart, supra note 116, at 854. 
 241. John Stanton, Murderers on Parole, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 149, 152 (1969). 
 242. Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law’s Hubris, 
43 EMORY L. J. 913 (1994). 
 243. Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 
10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 149 (1997). 
 244. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 742-43 (1992). 
 245. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (holding that expert testimony based on a scientific principle is 
admissible only if the principle is “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
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is no extra-scientific standpoint from which judges can gauge the 
reliability of scientific evidence and that scientists are better prepared to 
make this assessment than are judges.246 Schwartz insists that the 
reliability of scientific evidence must be decided by scientists, not 
technicians.247 In the matter of future dangerousness predictions, this 
would mean that experimental psychologists, not clinicians, would make 
the reliability assessment.248 
But even a re-vamped Frye rule, such as that proposed by 
Schwartz,249 would not apply to all expert testimony, only to that which 
is considered “scientific.” This loophole allows “technical” knowledge 
to fly in below the Daubert or Frye radar, as future dangerousness 
testimony did in Nenno. Indeed, in considering the testimony of, say, an 
airplane pilot or a real estate appraiser, a test for acceptance in the 
scientific community would be out of place, as we do not think of these 
professions as scientific. Neither would we expect such witnesses to be 
peer reviewed and published. But we should have a right to expect from 
them some showing of reliability (the word which summarizes the key 
insight of Daubert and Kumho). How would we know if an airplane pilot 
has reliable knowledge about flying airplanes? If he has been flying 
them for years and has safely taken off and landed thousands of times, 
he obviously has some reliable knowledge about flying airplanes. What 
about a real estate appraiser? We could compare his appraisals of 
different houses to the actual prices at which those houses were sold 
within a reasonable time after the appraisals. In Kumho, Justice Breyer 
wrote for the Court: 
In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, 
for example, how often an engineering expert’s experience-
based methodology has produced erroneous results, or whether 
such a method is generally accepted in the relevant engineering 
community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask even of a 
witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a 
perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, 
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would 
recognize as acceptable.250 
Even the above examples, however, have ominous pitfalls, in my view. I 
 
particular field in which it belongs”). 
 246. Schwartz, supra note 243, at 193-96. 
 247. Id. at 208. 
 248. See Milich, supra note 242, at 917. 
 249. Schwartz, supra note 243, at 206-37. 
 250. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151. 
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am sure the engineering expert will tell us his methodology is flawless 
and generally accepted in the engineering community. So let’s not ask 
him; let’s ask other members of the engineering community. As for the 
perfume tester, no doubt, he will not hesitate to say that others in the 
field would recognize his preparation as acceptable; therefore, the query 
should not be put to him, but to those “others” in the field—or, even 
better, to disinterested observers outside the field who have had a chance 
to study and evaluate the methodology. 
Putting aside for the moment whether the expertise involved in 
future dangerousness predictions is “scientific” or “technical,” how 
would we know if these predictions are reliable? We would look at 
whether, in the past, such predictions have been borne out by experience. 
Reliability must be the common denominator in admitting both scientific 
and technical expert testimony. 
The Nenno court fudged this issue by substituting the word 
“legitimate” for the word “reliable,”251 and deciding that the subject was 
legitimate because it had some connection with actual observation.252 
That isn’t enough to establish its reliability. Figuring out tests of 
reliability for technical experts should be a matter of simple common 
sense for judges who are willing to take the responsibility seriously. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court committed constitutional error in its 1976 
decision in Jurek, when it allowed speculations about a defendant’s as-
yet-unperformed acts to determine whether he would be put to death. 
The Court brushed aside any consideration of due process and ignored 
its own precedents that held that “death is different.” It compounded the 
error in 1983 in Barefoot, when it allowed psychiatrists’ predictions of 
future behavior to be admitted even though the psychiatrists had not 
personally examined the defendant and even though the psychiatric 
profession as a whole rejected such predictions as unacceptably 
inaccurate. This ignored the highly misleading and unfairly prejudicial 
(see Federal Rule of Evidence 403) nature of the testimony. While 
Daubert’s gatekeeping role for judges and demand for reliability as well 
as relevance would seem to have raised the standards high enough that 
such testimony should be excluded, Daubert left serious loopholes (lack 
of guidance regarding nonscientific expert testimony and a too-flexible 
test for reliability). As applied in Texas, the future dangerousness 
 
 251. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 560-61. 
 252. Id. at 562. 
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element of the penalty phase in capital murder cases is a façade that 
shields the process’s lack of due process; Texas should adopt a more 
honest sentencing procedure, one that gives convicted defendants a 
reasonable chance of coming out of it alive. And we still need to re-think 
our tests for admissibility of expert testimony, both scientific and 
technical. A re-vamped Frye test may be the answer for scientific 
testimony, while a more commonsense approach to assessing reliability 
may be a solution for determining the admissibility of technical experts’ 
testimony. 
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